Why fighting in Somalia is threatening Kenya's security and miraa trade

Somalia parliament Speaker Abdulkadir Mohammed Nur says the Federal government should ask Kenya why it continues allowing terrorists to carry out violence in Somalia. [AFP]

Fighting in Somalia’s South West State is straining relations between Nairobi and Mogadishu, with potential consequences for regional security, diplomacy and trade.

Senior officials in Mogadishu are now accusing Kenya of habouring Somali terrorists allegedly plotting to destabilise their country while taking refuge in Nairobi hotels under State protection.

On Sunday, Somalia parliament Speaker Abdulkadir Mohammed Nur said the Federal government should ask Kenya why it continues allowing terrorists to carry out violence in Somalia.

“We should demand for answers from Kenya through diplomatic means over the role Nairobi is playing in the resurgence of fighting in all areas around Baidoa,” said Nur.

The continued presence of former South West President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen in Nairobi has irked senior government officials in Mogadishu.

Laftagareen now lives in Kenya while forces loyal to him are actively challenging the federally backed administration of his successor, Aden Mohamed Nur, known as Aden Madobe on the battlefield.

He was ousted by the national army in March this year, which was supported by Turkish airpower, but forces loyal to Laftagareen have now made rapid advances in the bay region, retaking the towns of Dinsor, Burhakabo. Awdinle, Berdale and Qansa Dhere.

Tension in Southern Somalia escalated early this year, when the South West region suspended cooperation with the Federal Gocernment in Mogadishu.

Cooperation between the South West State with the federal government was suspended on March 17, 2026 over alleged interference and constitutional and electoral disagreements. Commercial flights between Mogadishu and Baidoa were subsequently stopped as fighting erupted in the region and into the border areas with Kenya.

The regional assembly in Baidoa elected Aden Madobe as South West president on June 10, 2026, leading to Laftagareen rejecting his earlier resignation and also ignoring the transition process agreed between the two parties. And now, renewed fighting has been raging since last month.

Laftagareen-aligned forces clashed with federal and regional troops around Baidoa, with conflicting reports about casualties and battlefield gains.

On October 13, barely two weeks ago, Somalia placed Laftagareen and nine others on its national financial sanctions list over suspected Al-Shabaab links and terrorist financing, ordering asset freezes and transaction restrictions.

The Federal authorities also accuse Laftagareen’s fighters of cooperating with Al-Shabaab, while his camp denies the allegations.

Despite the new developments, Kenya’s longstanding relationship with Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe remains another source of suspicion in Mogadishu, even as the renewed fighting gives Al-Shabaab room to exploit the growing regional tension.

“Political fighting diverts security resources from counterinsurgency operations and creates opportunities for the militant group to exploit divisions,” says former diplomatic Dr. Adul-Malik Hussein.

Other disruptions could through possible diplomatic and trade measures such as new miraa (Khat) suspension of the green twigs imported from Kenya or a far reaching diplomatic decision like might be adopted Somali government policy.

“Threat to Kenyan miraa business people could hurt farmers, harvesters, packers, transporters, exporters and cargo operators, particularly in Meru. The crop’s perishability increases the risk of immediate losses,” says Hussein.

Records indicate that the previous trade disruption from March 2020, because of the miraa export suspension, created a loss of more than 50 tonnes of Khat worth over Sh20 million daily.

The stand-off could also creates tension between Kenya and Turkey, whose military role in supporting the Somali federal government through training and equipment, including supply of drones is ongoing and is not in dispute. Its F-16 fighter jetsdeployment was publicly confirmed in April 2026.

Sources also say Turkey’s strategic investments, especially in offshore exploratory drilling and a spaceport project deepen Ankara’s interests in Somalia.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), alleged support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is also creating tension in the region, even as Iraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also flexes his muscles in Somali-land.

On October 18, 2026, a map was displayed categorising Somaliland and Puntland as friendly to Israel and the UAE.

In Somlia itself, there is another brewing dispute over disputed national elections.

Somalia’s electoral commission has announced that parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 15, 2027, and presidential elections on May 15, 2027.  The opposition however disputes the timetable and electoral framework.

Diplomatic engagement, scrutiny of foreign-support allegations, humanitarian access and protection of legitimate trade are essential to preventing Somalia’s conflict from becoming entangled in wider regional and Middle Eastern rivalries.

Fighting around Baidoa is therefore straining relations between Nairobi and Mogadishu, threatening security cooperation and exposing Kenyan agricultural exports to renewed political pressure.

Latest reports now say Laftagareen-aligned forces are threatening roads supplying Baidoa, raising the prospect of disrupted humanitarian access and further displacement.

The fighting has intensified scrutiny of Kenya’s decision to host the former regional leader.

Somali federal officials accuse Laftagareen’s forces of cooperating with Al-Shabaab. His camp rejects the accusation and blames Mogadishu for the conflict. Allegations of Kenyan support and UAE financing getting through Kenya have further inflamed the dispute.

The confrontation grew out of the collapse of Laftagareen’s alliance with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud over constitutional changes, elections and the division of power between the federal government and member states.

Former South West president suspended cooperation with Mogadishu on March 17 and Laftagareen then resigned from his senior position in the president’s Justice and Solidarity Party the following day, turning an institutional dispute into an open political break.

After the federal government declared his administration’s mandate expired, Laftagareen organised a regional parliamentary election on March 28 and secured another term. Mogadishu rejected the vote. Two days later, federal troops took control of Baidoa, and Laftagareen announced his resignation before leaving for Kenya.

The regional assembly elected Aden Madobe president on June 10. Laftagareen subsequently withdrew his resignation and rejected the new administration.

Repeated clashes followed. Heavy fighting around Baidoa on September 28 involved federal and regional troops against Laftagareen-aligned militias, with heavy weapons and drones featuring in accounts of the battle.

For Kenya, the dispute reaches beyond the fate of a regional administration, because deteriorating relations with Mogadishu could weaken intelligence sharing, complicate military coordination and expose Kenyan troops serving in Somalia to additional risks.

Ethiopia faces similar pressure to Kenya’s because its troops, deployed through the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia and bilateral arrangements, occupy positions close to the contested towns.

Residents have described scenes of local officials seeking shelter at an Ethiopian base during the advances while Ethiopian soldiers remained inside their camps without taking any action.

Those accounts have fuelled anger in Mogadishu and drawn foreign military deployments deeper into the struggle over regional authority.

Kenya’s longstanding relationship with Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, known as Ahmed Madobe, has already generated friction with Somalia’s federal government. Hosting Laftagareen has now become another source of mistrust, linking Nairobi to two regional leaders at odds with Mogadishu.

Around Baidoa, national disagreements are converging with a regional leadership struggle that has already moved from political confrontation to sustained fighting.

For Kenya, the consequences extend from military cooperation and border security to agricultural livelihoods. For civilians in South West, the immediate danger is the tightening contest over the roads, towns and supply routes on which daily life depends.

Risk to Kenya due to prolonged fighting could increase displacement, weapons trafficking and insecurity towards its borders, while weakening intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation.